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Hybrid healthcare governance for improvement? Combining top-
down and bottom-up approaches to public sector regulation  
Abstract 
Improving healthcare governance is an enduring challenge for policy-makers. We consider 
two national healthcare regulators adopting novel ‘hybrid’ regulatory control strategies in 
pursuit of improvement. Hybrids combine elements usually found separately. Scotland and 
Ireland’s regulators combine:  (1) top-down formal regulatory mechanisms deterring breaches 
of protocol and enacting penalties where they occur (e.g. standard-setting, monitoring, 
accountability); and (2) bottom-up capacity building and persuasive encouragement of 
adherence to guidance by professional self-determination, implementation and improvement 
support (e.g. training, stimulating interventions). We identify socio-historical contextual 
factors constraining and enabling regulatory hybridity, whether and how it can be recreated, 
and circumstances when the approaches might be delivered separately. Using our findings, 
we develop a goal-oriented governance framework illustrating distinct, yet complementary, 
national and local organizational roles: (1) ensuring the adoption and implementation of best-
practice, (2) enabling and (3) empowering staff to adapt and add to national mandates and (4) 
embedding cultures of improvement. 
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Introduction 
Public sector improvement is an enduring challenge, and healthcare improvement is a 
particular concern (Francis, 2010; Keogh, 2013). A high-quality and efficient healthcare 
service can help enhance the quality and longevity of life, and balance public finances. To 
sustain system-wide healthcare quality, the recent Berwick report (2013) suggests that a top-
down focus on regulatory conformity needs to be complemented by bottom-up investment in 
the improvement capacity of health service staff, with the objective of generating responsive 
‘learning organizations’. Top-down approaches to attaining public management goals adopt a 
rational, control orientation, limiting discretion (Schofield, 2001). However, the requirement 
to ‘translate’ and adapt national goals to fit local contexts (Ansari et al., 2010; van Gestel and 
Nyberg, 2009), and to add to national agendas in the light of local challenges (McDermott et 
al., 2013), is increasingly recognized. Such bottom-up approaches require the development of 
local improvement capacity – to identify context-specific requirements for change, to gain 
appropriate support and resourcing, and to implement required amendments (ibid.).  
Competing models of regulation embody these differing approaches to achieving policy 
goals. On the one hand is a preference for deterrence approaches, with a preventative 
orientation, and enforcement through directives, targets, sanctions and regulatory escalation. 
On the other, is a dependence on more persuasive methods, with an emphasis on capacity 
building and encouragement - developing employees’ focus on quality, stimulating local 
quality initiatives, and building improvement skills. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 21) 
describe this tension as knowing ‘When to punish; When to persuade’?  
Scotland and Ireland’s healthcare quality improvement efforts are respectively 
supported by single national regulatory organizations, namely Healthcare Improvement 
3 | P a g e  
 
Scotland (HIS) and the Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA). Both 
organizations are unusually configured to deliver improvement through a hybrid of top-down 
deterrence and bottom-up persuasive approaches. These are often presented as dichotomous, 
meaning their combination has been omitted from regulatory typologies (see Grabosky and 
Braithwaite, 1986). HIS and HIQA’s ‘mixing’ contrasts with the regulatory pyramid’s 
approach, which treats them as alternatives (c.f. Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). In adopting 
both approaches, these organizations internalize longstanding tension within the public sector 
between top-down control through governance and regulatory performance management 
regimes, and enabling bottom-up improvement and innovation by empowering staff (c.f. 
NESC, 2012; Newman, 2001). Previous work has identified how these approaches have 
resulted in competition between overlaid norms and assumptions within regulated 
institutions, potentially making them hard to reconcile (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; 
Newman, 2001). However the potential benefits of such combinations are reflected in Ayres 
and Braithwaite’s assertion (1992: 25) that ‘The trick of successful regulation is to establish a 
synergy between punishment and persuasion’.  
In this article, our focus is on whether and how the regulators combine the two 
approaches to generate a new ‘hybrid’ form of regulation.  Hybrids are composite phenomena 
produced by elements usually found separately (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013). We follow Reed 
(2011) in considering hybrid control systems as extending top-down formal regulatory 
strategies to encompass more dispersed, normative and internalised forms of influence. In 
organizational terms, hybrids represent a combination of two modes of organizing that 
achieve a degree of stability (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013). Hybridity often occurs in ambiguous 
domains (Noordegraaf, 2007), and can therefore be dynamic (Miller et al., 2008). Fischer and 
Ferlie (2013) identify three potential outcomes from hybridity: complementarity between 
elements that can result in synergistic benefits and added value (of particular interest to us, 
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following Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992); tensions that can be managed and; escalating contest 
and contradiction where paradigms interact but lack commonality. Our study exposes the 
complexities of trying to combine and reconcile what could be perceived as dichotomous 
regulatory approaches. In undertaking our analysis of regulatory hybridity, we begin to 
address calls to consider new ways of regulating (Parker, 2013), in particular those that 
support proactive improvement and innovation (Berwick, 2013; Braithwaite, 2013; 
Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998). We also address calls for insight into the conditions that 
shape and limit ‘ready hybridization’ (Fischer and Ferlie, 2013), and begin to clarify 
situations in which hybridity may - or may not - be beneficial (c.f. Pache and Santos, 2013) 
The article is structured in four parts, beginning with a brief overview of theory 
relating to the role of governance and regulation in achieving healthcare improvement. 
Second, we detail our methods. Third, through documentary and interview analysis, we chart 
the historical establishment of hybrid regulation in Scotland, and the emergent hybridization 
process in Ireland. Comparison provides insight into specific aspects of socio-historical 
context that can mitigate contradictions or exacerbate competition between top-down 
deterrence and bottom-up persuasive approaches to improvement.  Last, we consider whether 
regulatory hybridity leads to synergistic benefits, beyond those perceived to result from the 
independent pursuit of these strategies. On the basis of our findings, we develop a four 
quadrant integrative governance framework, to support improvement.  We adopt a goal-
orientation that contrasts with previous biases to process (c.f. Ayres and Braithwaite’s, 1992; 
Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986). We illustrate distinct yet complementary national and local 
organizational roles: (1) ensuring the adoption of best-practice, (2) enabling and (3) 
empowering employees to adapt and add to national mandates, and (4) embedding a culture 
of improvement. This provides a potentially useful framework in considering national and 
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local responsibility for top-down and bottom-up approaches, whether or not hybrid regulation 
is being pursued.  
 
Building on previous theory 
Health systems governance for improvement 
Health systems governance encompasses ensuring that healthcare organizations assure and 
improve the quality of their services (Francis, 2010). Regulation is one important national 
aspect of governance, defined as ‘the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of 
others according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour modification’ (Black, 2002: 26). In short, Black 
characterises regulation as an ‘intentional, systematic attempt at problem-solving’. Kingsford 
Smith (2002) also emphasises the pluralist, intentional, and relational nature of regulation, 
which can be pursued using an array of techniques, individually, in configuration or in 
escalation, to help solve problems. HIS and HIQA are structured to enhance improvement 
capacity via simultaneous pursuit of top-down deterrence approaches on the one hand and 
bottom-up persuasive engagement on the other. These have traditionally been alternated in 
pursuit of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). 
 
Transcending top-down deterrence and bottom-up persuasive regulatory approaches: 
From responsive to hybrid regulation?  
Ayers and Braithwaite coined the term responsive regulation to capture ‘how the 
implementation of quality standards is encouraged by a balance of sanctions and supports’ 
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(NESC, 2012: xiii). Responsive regulation aims to overcome the limits of top-down rule-
based regulation via a central regulator and bottom-up self-regulation by professionals and 
service providers. The combination of these approaches is often depicted as a regulatory 
pyramid, where self-regulation and voluntary approaches provide a broad base, with 
command and control approaches - and their associated sanctions - at the narrow apex. 
Responsive regulation is premised on initial cooperative dialogue and assumption of virtue 
(Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998), the (potentially naïve) assumption that parties are willing 
and able to communicate to resolve problems (Parker, 2013), and a strategy of gradual 
escalation if this does not occur (Mascini, 2013). Thus the pyramid enables regulators to 
select whether to adopt a persuasive or punitive style in a given context (Mascini, 2013), with 
persuasive strategies recommended in the face of cooperation, and punitive in the face of 
opposition. A punitive approach should only be adopted when persuasion has failed – to 
enhance legitimacy (Braithwaite, 2011), and promote transparency (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992). De-escalation is also recommended in response to cooperation (Braithwaite, 2013; 
Heimer, 2011). This can help to preserve relationships and trust (Ayres and Braithwaite, 
1992), as regulatees tend to focus most on negative signals (Mascini and Van Wijk, 2009). In 
addition, following Black’s (1976) theory of law, Grabosky and Braithwaite (1986) suggest 
that reduced relational distance should decrease the tendency to use formal sanctions. 
Stringency in regulation may or may not be positive – while Grabosky and Braithwaite 
(1986: 217) note ‘some tendencies for closeness to be associated with a rejection of 
punitiveness towards industry, it may also be associated with a superior capacity to achieve 
substantive regulatory ends by persuasion or the give-and-take which tend to be part of 
ongoing relationships’. This ‘give and take’ is a central part of responsive regulation, 
reflected in Heimer’s assertion (2011: 663) that responsive regulation ‘is not simply 
something that a regulator unilaterally does to a regulatee’.  
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 Like all regulatory approaches, responsive regulation encounters challenges (c.f. 
Braithwaite, 2013). Regulators have struggled to implement the pyramid responsively 
(Mascini, 2013), focusing mainly on enforcement and sanctioning strategies (Parker, 2013; 
Mascini, 2013). This underemphasises potential for proactive local innovation and 
improvement, illustrated in Braithwaite et al.’s (2007) overview of the benefits of creative 
space in advocating for the elderly. Indeed, Braithwaite (2013: 142) explicitly recognises the 
importance of practitioner innovation in his assertion that ‘Regulatory theory fails when it 
neglects scanning widely for the experience of how practitioners solve the theoretically 
unsolvable’. Similarly, Gunningham and Sinclair (1998: 413-414) note:  
‘major criticisms of much conventional regulation are the lack of incentives for firms 
to continuously improve…[…] A key challenge for policymakers, therefore, is to 
ensure that regulatory solutions…[…] reward enterprises for going ‘beyond 
compliance’.  
Attempts are made to address this issue in the ‘strength-based pyramid’ which adopts an 
appreciative orientation (described in Braithwaite et al., 2007). However, encouraging 
bottom-up service improvement is not novel. Policy implementation research has 
distinguished between those who avoid or abstain from national mandates, ‘adopters’ who 
comply, ‘adapters’, who make appropriate local adjustments, and ‘extrapreneurs’ who add 
extra dimensions (McDermott et al., 2013). Entrepreneurial front-line workers’ distributed 
engagement in initiatives can provide contextualized local knowledge of what is required and 
how it might be achieved (ibid; van Gestel and Nyberg, 2009). Thus, the rationale for hybrid 
health system governance - encompassing top-down deterrence mechanisms to promote good 
practice, together with bottom-up persuasively oriented capacity building for ongoing 
proactive service improvement and innovation - is strong. Our case-studies are premised on 
organizations in which this combination is actively being pursued, enabling us to answer 
Parker’s (2013) call for studies to consider new ways of regulating. 
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Methods 
International comparison 
This international study compared national approaches to supporting quality and safety in two 
policy contexts and four acute hospitals (our hospital level findings are reported separately). 
Scotland and Ireland are small, proximally located contexts that have heavily invested in 
health service improvement. Public service governance and improvement poses particular 
challenges in small contexts – although scale is mediated by other economic and socio-
political factors (Cole and Stafford, 2014). Scotland’s healthcare is predominantly provided 
through the public National Health Service. Ireland also has a large public health service, 
with private provision available within the physical infrastructure of public as well as private 
hospitals. Both display moves towards the development of hybrid regulators. Thus they 
provide an appropriate context for consideration of our research questions, namely: (1) 
whether synergistic hybridity (displaying synergy between top-down deterrence and bottom-
up persuasive approaches, with impact beyond their independent pursuit c.f. Fischer and 
Ferlie, 2013) has been achieved in the national regulation of healthcare quality in each 
context and; (2) what factors enable or constrain the emergence of hybridity. Our discussion 
concludes by considering what governance lessons can be derived from their experiences for 
other health systems.  
 
Data collection and analysis 
Data analysis initially encompassed a comprehensive review of national policy documents. 
Interviews with forty-four national, strategic level respondents (twenty-two in each context) 
ensued. Interviews were conducted with staff from within organizations dealing with health 
policy, health management, the professions, and quality and safety within each health system. 
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Thematic interview analysis regarding the role of each regulator explored codes including: 
‘role’; ‘inspection and audit’; ‘implementation focus’; ‘building capacity’; ‘innovation’; and 
‘tensions’. Quotes are drawn from the full range of these respondents. Emergent analytical 
themes were added to the coding schedule and led to preliminary theory generation. Finally, 
we undertook cross-case comparative analysis. This enabled consideration of similarities and 
differences in the emergence and form of national regulatory regimes. It also supported 
theory building, positioning findings against extant literature. Figure 1 summarizes our 
analytic strategy.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 1  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Next, we introduce each regulator, providing an analytic chronology of their historical 
context. This is due to the importance of context in designing regulatory strategies and 
interventions (c.f. Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998) and associated implications for policy 
transfer.  
Placing regulatory regimes in context: The emergence of HIS and 
HIQA  
Scotland’s evolution to hybridity: the emergence of Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS) 
Healthcare Improvement Scotland (HIS) came into existence in April 2011, as a 
reconfiguration of NHS Quality Improvement Scotland. HIS is part of the NHS, one of eight 
national boards (illustrated in Figure 2). It is responsible for generating standards, supporting 
improvement, the regulation of the independent health sector and the inspection of public and 
private health organizations. Four phases of the Scottish quality movement, comprising the 
historical emergence of HIS, are detailed below.  
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Phase 1: Compiling evidence to provide advice and guidance 
Scotland’s whole-system approach to quality and safety was influenced by the 1983 Griffiths 
report. This led to the establishment of groups concerned with good managerial and effective 
clinical practice (detailed in Figure 4). Subsequently, the 1989 White Paper ‘Working for 
Patients’ required that all hospital doctors participate in medical audit. It also saw the 
introduction of the Clinical Resource and Audit Group, later instrumental in the 1993 
development of the Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network. This medically-led 
multidisciplinary network became responsible for developing evidence-based clinical practice 
guidelines (see Harbour et al., 2011). This year also pioneered the production and publication 
of clinical outcomes indicators (see Scottish Executive, 2000). However, patchy coverage and 
a desire to link to NHS priorities influenced the emergence of a national system for quality 
assurance during the late 1990s (c.f. Woods and Carter, 2003).  
 
Phase 2: Quality assurance 
The Health Act (1999) introduced local clinical governance, defined as ‘corporate 
accountability for clinical performance’ (see Scottish Office, 1998). A focus on evidence-
based clinical practice was centralized and formalized in the establishment of the Clinical 
Standards Board for Scotland in 1999. An aligned development was the establishment of the 
Health Technology Board for Scotland in 2000, to conduct technology and medicines 
assessments. Scotland’s approach to managing health service quality via national leadership 
through systems and establishing and monitoring best practice became established during this 
time.  
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Phase 3: Implementation and improvement support 
In January 2003 concerns about fragmentation led to the consolidation of the organizations 
responsible for health service quality (the Clinical Resource and Audit Group, the Clinical 
Standards Board, the Health Technology Board and two others) to form NHS Quality 
Improvement Scotland (QIS). A national body, QIS was given a mandate to develop and 
deliver a centrally coordinated strategy for improving clinical effectiveness and the quality of 
health services. In 2005, SIGN became part of QIS. It later acquired an increased focus on 
patient and public involvement, with the creation of the Scottish Health Council within it. 
Subsequently, in 2008, QIS was given by the task, under the auspices of the Scottish Patient 
Safety Alliance, of delivering the Scottish Patient Safety Programme (SPSP). The SPSP was 
designed and delivered in partnership with the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (see 
Haraden and Leitch, 2011). Its premise is the spread and adaptation of existing knowledge to 
multiple settings, underpinned by the plan, do, study, act cycle.  
 
Phase 4: Emergence of scrutiny and inspection 
In 2008/09 QIS introduced its ‘integrated cycle of improvement’ comprising (1) advice, 
guidance and standards; (2) implementation and improvement support and; (3) assessment, 
measurement and reporting (NHSQIS, 2009). In 2009 the Healthcare Environment 
Inspectorate (HEI) was established in QIS, to undertake at least one announced and one 
unannounced inspection of all acute hospitals across NHS Scotland every three years. The 
scrutiny aspect of QIS’s role was further emphasized when QIS became Healthcare 
Improvement Scotland (HIS) in 2011, with the extension of HEI’s remit to include the care of 
older people in acute hospitals and on the assumption of responsibility for inspection and 
regulation of independent healthcare (see Scottish Government, 2007). HIS’s integrated cycle 
of improvement is intended to facilitate coherent quality enhancement (NHSQIS, 2008), 
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reflecting the Scottish Government’s aim of enhancing integration of quality and safety issues 
set out in its Healthcare Quality Strategy (Scottish Government,  2010).  
Ireland’s ongoing evolution to hybridity: the Health Information and 
Quality Authority (HIQA) 
The Health Information and Quality Authority (HIQA) is an independent statutory 
government-funded agency. HIQA’s objective, set out in legislation, is ‘to promote safety 
and quality in the provision of health and personal social services for the benefit of the health 
and welfare of the public’ (DoHC, 2008). Established in 2007, it lacks HIS’s major 
institutional legacy, although one Scottish respondent noted that interchange with senior QIS 
executives informed HIQA’s development. HIQA’s first (2008-2010) Corporate Plan (HIQA, 
2008) notes its responsibility for developing, monitoring and enforcing standards; providing a 
comprehensive information framework; undertaking health technology assessments; 
reporting its work and; engaging effectively with service users, providers and policy makers. 
Although its’ first strategic objectives didn’t refer to ‘capability and capacity building’, this 
subsequently evolved as an explicit focus. During data collection, HIQA was enacting its 
second (2010-2012) Corporate Plan. This describes a range of roles, noting that beyond its:  
‘important regulatory role, we also have essential roles in advising on health 
information, informing decision-making, supporting and promoting the capacity and 
capability of the health and social care system’. (HIQA, 2010: 29) 
The focus on developing a supportive role and enhancing improvement capacity emerged 
from learning and reflection on its 2007-2010 operations (HIQA, 2010).  Reorganization 
along functional lines led HIQA’s four core activities to be organized and delivered via 
separate directorates (regulation, supporting improvement, assessing health technologies and 
improving outcomes through information – see HIQA, 2013d). A Director of Safety and 
Quality Improvement was appointed in July 2012 (HIQA, 2012), with the Improvement 
Directorate responsible for:  
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‘actively supporting and enabling a culture of patient safety and quality improvement 
across and within the health and social care system by helping to build capability and 
capacity in the people providing services. This will be done through the development 
of national standards and guidance in consultation with key stakeholders and the 
provision of training in quality improvement methodologies and tools’ (HIQA 
website, 2013a).  
HIQA’s establishment marked a large change in Ireland’s approach to achieving quality and 
safety in healthcare provision. Historically this was attained through professional regulation. 
However repeated structural reform, detailed below, has increased national coordination.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 3  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Phase 1: The emergence of a centralized national health system  
In Ireland, the consistent attainment of the policy goals inherent in the 1994 and 2001 
healthcare strategies was hampered by the regional administration of health service delivery. 
This led to a major restructuring and consolidation of the Irish health service (illustrated in 
Figure 3). Under the 2004 Health Act, national healthcare policy was entrusted to the 
Department of Health and Children (DoHC). A new body, the Health Service Executive 
(HSE), was established to implement policy and manage the delivery of health services 
across the country. 
 
Phase 2: Proactive management of quality 
The development of the HSE paved the way for the proactive management of service quality. 
During 2008-09 the HSE piloted and introduced a performance monitoring system for 
hospitals.  However it is the establishment of HIQA as an external regulatory body under the 
2007 Health Act that is the focus of our analysis. HIQA emerged in a tumultuous context, in 
the wake of major maternity (see Harding Clark, 2006) and nursing home scandals (see 
DoHC, 2008) that influenced its establishment. In its early days HIQA conducted a number 
of investigations into quality and safety concerns and published associated reports (see, for 
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example, HIQA, 2008a; 2009). These placed early emphasis on its investigation and 
inspection remit.  
To support HIQA, the 2008 Health Information Bill aimed to enable health service 
information to be used to monitor and enhance the quality and safety of care. That same year, 
a report published by the DoHC (2008) made a series of recommendations to improve the 
quality and safety of care. HIQA’s development is ongoing and it produced the ‘National 
Standards for Safer Better Healthcare’ in 2012 (HIQA, 2012), after we collected our data. As 
detailed later, HIQA appears to be proactively continuing and developing efforts to move 
beyond its initial focus on applying top-down deterrence approaches, to enhance 
improvement support.  
 
Comparing Scotland and Ireland  
Like Scotland, Ireland is increasingly characterized by an explicit policy focus on measuring 
and managing healthcare quality; regulation by a dedicated body and; the use of audit. 
However, their respective historical contexts raise three differences of note. First, HIS sits 
within, and HIQA without, national health service structures (see Figures 2 & 3). Second, the 
professions have held different roles and levels of involvement in each context, with more of 
a longstanding professionally-led history of standards generation in Scotland (c.f. Steel and 
Cylus, 2012). Third, Scotland’s move towards hybridity began with the provision of advice, 
guidance and standards, and then implementation and improvement support. The sharper 
focus on scrutiny, accountability and regulation emerged later. In contrast, Ireland began its 
journey towards hybridity with a focus on top-down deterrence mechanisms, with 
implementation and improvement support developed thereafter.  
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Interview findings: Whether and why hybridity has emerged   
Reed (2011) notes that hybridized forms of organizational control usually combine 
competing design principles and operational processes. Like Foucault (2003), and the ensuing 
‘governmentalists’, Reed’s (2011) discussion of hybridized control systems centres on the 
extension of formal regulatory control mechanisms, to encompass softer, internalized forms 
of normative socio-psychological, cultural and discursive control. For Reed (ibid), the 
process of hybridization is one through which increasingly complex, multi-level and multi-
dimensional control systems are developed. Here we consider whether HIS and HIQA can be 
characterized as displaying synergistic hybridity (c.f. Fischer and Ferlie, 2013) in national 
healthcare regulation (e.g. displaying both top-down and bottom-up strategies with evidence 
of impact beyond that resulting from their independent pursuit). Following Reed (2011), we 
note evidence of hybridity in HIS, and ongoing hybridization in HIQA. Interview findings 
detail the relative emphasis placed on (1) deterrence, including inspection and audit, and (2) 
persuasion, including attempts to support implementation, capacity building and innovation.  
Hybridity in Scotland: mitigated control, capacity-building and 
collaboration  
HIS enacts its control orientation by generating evidence and undertaking oversight. 
Respondents noted that inspection and audit are a ‘national imperative’ that are ‘not optional’ 
(SP4). However they also noted how HIS’s role extends beyond monitoring performance 
against national mandates:  
…the idea is you provide the guidance, you support the implementation of it and then 
you check up to see whether it is being implemented and to identify gaps where you 
need to do something new to get things moving. (SP2) 
 
…we can’t improve quality in this building but we can help people out there who 
actually can. (SP5) 
A number of respondents emphasized the organization’s deliberately mitigated and 
supportive approach, building on the principles of evidence-based medical practice:  
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We avoided the use of the word inspection and in that respect the interesting question 
that you pick up from talking to people… QIS [now HIS] didn’t have the profile that 
some inspectors and certainly our counterparts have across the border. (SP2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
...so we’re not the guys who come along with a report that’s going to get people in 
trouble[...] that we’re actually sort of a helpful partner in quality. (SP5) 
 
…[…] it makes sense to use evidence based interventions, it goes to their evidence 
based medicine. (SP8) 
In adopting this mitigated approach HIS benefits from, and builds upon, a long history of 
inclusive and collegiate relationships: 
…doing it in a way that engages rather than dictates so there is a far more 
authoritative way that England tries to do it. (SP12)  
…on the whole still in Scotland has wanted to sort of work with clinicians and with 
the [specialists] and has seen them as taking a leading role in developing standards 
and in developing guidance and taking forward the quality and strategy issue. (SP6) 
Respondents noted that HIS utilizes a number of strategies to build implementation and 
improvement capacity, helping health service employees to address their own local, as well 
as national, improvement agendas. Interventions include: educational resources; training in 
data management and quality improvement methods; providing ‘bundles’ of tested 
interventions to implement locally; and the facilitation of networks to enhance peer learning 
and provide peer support: 
…improvement tools and skills that not only do you use in your personal life but 
actually you can apply to any issue you’re trying to fix.  (SP16) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
…the main basket of tools if you like, is the associates of process improvement and the 
cycle of improvement. …learning sets, for five or six hundred people together on the 
system and to work on their results..[…] the third cohort of the Scottish Patient Safety 
Fellowship programme…[..] the expertise and support that we have got from IHI 
…that certainly made a big difference so that we have capability in frontline staff 
within our whole frontline, to be able to do that work for themselves.  (SP20)                                                                                                                                        
Together, these interventions enhanced capability to identify problems (via data), provided 
some strategies to address them (using ‘bundles’ and improvement support) and enabled staff 
to apply improvement techniques to emergent issues. In this way, HIS aimed to help support 
individuals and collaboratives implement good practice and develop their own innovations:  
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Trying to make sure that we don’t stifle innovation, to be able to provide them with at 
least some short-term support to get going…[…] and the learning to create their own 
communities of innovation is what we are really trying to encourage wherever 
possible. (SP4)  
 
…we are actually bringing together teams of people…[…] to develop their own sense 
of priorities and how are they going to tackle them, giving them the protected space 
and time to do that. (SP11) 
While respondents noted challenges in managing competing priorities, there was a sense in 
which the focus on mitigated control, capacity building and innovation had a shared focus on 
improvement and were successfully coexisting:  
I think I’ll come back to what I was saying earlier on about how it's given a drive 
commitment and purpose. (SP13) 
So, I think policy and improvement and quality, I think they are all entwined and very 
much in Scotland. (SP9) 
Some respondents provided descriptions that combined deterrence, persuasion and innovation 
roles, balancing top-down recommendations with being responsive to bottom-up needs: 
…our standards work and so on is around being responsive to local systems, 
genuinely listening to what local systems are telling us and making sure that what we 
deliver is a part of that and is acceptable around that.  (SP21) 
Increasingly as we identify areas of concern or poor performance – we are closing 
the loop and feeding that back to the local service.  And proposing discussions as to 
how we can work with them to improve the local situation before getting to that 
escalation point back to Scottish government. […]Recently we have had two examples 
of working with boards, where they have actually contacted us directly to say “We 
need a bit of help with this, can you work with us.”…[…] And I think that is the way 
forward for us, is actually being on the end of the phone and being able to send staff 
out to work with the local teams. (SP4) 
 
…none of this is a one trick pony so pulling together, a more integrated approach. 
(SP18) 
The first quote emphasises responsiveness to local needs. The second quote illustrates 
commitment to proactively supporting improvement, to avoid directive intervention. It also 
suggests health service employees’ willingness to engage with the organization to address 
service concerns. Here we see evidence not only of a combination of regulatory activities, but 
of synergistic benefits between them (e.g. standards development informed by local needs 
and concerns; improvement support helping to avoid regulatory intervention). However we 
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note that tensions remain, despite aspects of complementarity and synergistic hybridity. Next 
we consider HIQA.  
 
The ongoing emergence of hybridity in Ireland: From deterrence to 
hybridity?  
Respondents particularly emphasized HIQA’s role as an independent external regulator, its 
relatively nascent status, and its emergent role: 
[HIQA] it’s still to some extent finding its feet and navigating its way and it can’t 
cure all and, you know, it can’t isolate and identify problems and shortcomings in the 
long weekend. (IP4)  
 
We are starting to get to grips with it. But we are still kind of forming to some extent. 
Storming and forming around it. (IP15) 
Despite its continued development, HIQA was described as having a deterrence orientation, 
with emphasis on its role in establishing standards, inspecting and auditing. 
It was always envisaged that the national standards, the standards that we had 
developed would provide the basis for what licensing would look like. (IP6) 
 
They really have led the way in terms of audit. (IP1) 
 
They have [a] lead to a lot of the kind of reactive patient safety side of quality. (IP14) 
Some respondents saw this as a strong, positive driver of change. However, it was 
consistently noted that HIQA’s initial deterrence orientation had led to somewhat tense 
relationships between the regulator and other organizations. One respondent described it as 
‘the Big Brother type’ noting that ‘the HIQA relationship is much less collaborative...[…] it 
is a somewhat tricky relationship’ (IP14). Suggestions of HIQA’s strained relationships with 
other bodies may be related to its independent position and external relationship  with the 
health service (see Figure 3), as well as its capacity to give formal warnings, and even close 
institutions:  
We have [HIQA] the external regulators establishing standards and inspecting. (IP3)                                                                                                                                                                                   
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HIQA and the powers that it has been given for unannounced inspections for, you 
know, for formal warnings of workplaces or care institutions, the power to close you 
down if you don't meet a standard. (IP4) 
Such suggestions may also reflect the difficult context in which HIQA emerged. HIQA’s 
early history was marked by its response to a number of large-scale scandals. Respondents 
suggested that a focus on ‘naming and shaming’ may have undermined early proactive 
mobilisation for improvement: 
The agenda has been arising from a lot of high profile failings of care and a lot of 
name, blame and shame and that sort of thing.  I think it is difficult to mobilize people 
around this because I think it has been somewhat tainted by some of the negativity 
arising from some of those high profile failings of care.  (IP15)          
Despite HIQA’s emergent focus on supporting improvement and enabling a quality-oriented 
culture, this role was not yet widely recognised by respondents.  
They [HIQA] can point out what’s wrong, but they don’t have a responsibility for 
making it right and managing it… the modus operandi of HIQA is such that, you 
know, it is the anathema of, you know, a systemic uplift, or a systemic review.  It is 
very much individual, it named like in its inspections it names the person in charge. 
(IP4) 
 
We would have regular meetings with [HIQA] them…Sometimes we struggle with 
implementation of our recommendations but we strive to do that… (IP15) 
Importantly respondents recognized that cultural change and building both the regulators’ and 
the regulated organizations’ capacity for improvement would take time.  
I think clearly any system can’t just rely on an external regulator and the emphasis 
has to be on building strong internal mechanisms of assurance within the providers 
themselves and then HIQA is there then, in many ways, as a regulator, to validate 
those internal mechanisms of quality assurance. (IP16) 
 
Having a system for external assurance around quality and safety shouldn’t be seen 
as a substitute for having internal systems. I know certainly in terms of the discourse 
or dialogue that I would have been involved in, people would have sort of said – well, 
why are you coming along as the HSE looking for us to do this when HIQA will be 
doing that? (IP15) 
A further theme was the need to build role clarity and enhance coordination between the 
variety of bodies involved in delivering quality and safety: 
We have a Memorandum of Agreement with HIQA, we are going to have a 
Memorandum of Agreement with xxx because we are trying to tie up loops. (IP7) 
Indeed, one respondent (IP2) noted that an OECD Report had recommended a reduction in 
the number of bodies in existence – something that Scotland did early on in the development 
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of its improvement agenda. In summary, respondents appreciated the difficult context in 
which HIQA emerged, perceived standards as a natural evolution within the health system, 
but identified a need to clarify the distribution of roles across the organizations in the health 
service, and to develop explicit strategies for supporting implementation and proactive 
improvement and innovation (although not necessarily by HIQA itself). There was also some 
concern regarding the legacy of HIQA’s early engagement in investigating major health 
service scandals, and establishing a more positive orientation. At the time of the research, 
HIQA was displaying a strong deterrence orientation, but with an emergent emphasis on a 
hybrid approach. Next, we build on these findings to address Fischer and Ferlie’s (2013) call 
for insight into the conditions that shape or limit ready hybridization.  
What factors enabled and constrained the emergence of hybridity in 
national regulatory regimes?  
Here we consider socio-historical developments enabling the development of hybridity in 
HIS and constraining its emergence in HIQA. We focus on differences in their contexts 
(receptivity, critical incidents, structure of the regulator, and potential path dependency) and 
development processes (building credibility, clinical collaboration and crafting mechanisms). 
Key phases and historical developments are summarised in Figure 4.  
The emergence of hybridity in HIS: A crafted, collaborative approach in a receptive 
context  
HIS is part of NHS Scotland. It emerged in a receptive context after a near thirty year 
development process that amalgamated pre-existing organizations (see Figure 4). HIS 
therefore gained from historical investment of political attention, time, resources and clinical 
engagement:  
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Government has taken the initiative in this and it would not have been possible for us 
to get as far as we’ve got had there not been strong support from successive ministers, 
successive chief executives and successive chief nursing officers and chief medical 
officers in particular.  So there’s been a very strong, central focus….[…] HIS is still 
a, I won’t say revered institution, but a respected institution.  (SP 2) 
 
We have engaged the clinical community.  (SP4) 
One respondent noted that Scotland lost ‘ten years of issuing beautiful documents saying 
what should be done.  And them having only minimal impact’ (SP2). This served as a critical 
incident, leading QIS to develop a strong focus on enhancing capability before the addition of 
an explicit inspection focus. In fact inspection came late – twenty-five years – into Scotland’s 
improvement efforts:  
We have got a strong set of foundations around quality and safety.  It hasn’t come to 
us; it isn’t something that is new to people. We have had a strong history in clinical 
audit.  We have had the Scottish Intercollegiate Guideline network for some 
considerable time.  There havebeen some foundations to build on.  This is not a 
countercultural approach that we are trying to take on.   It builds on work that we 
have already done and it is an attempt to accelerate that. (SP3) 
In Scotland, the introduction of bottom-up improvement support and capacity building prior 
to introducing the top-down inspectorate and scrutiny role was important - helping to 
establish longstanding collaborative relationships, continued across the various organizational 
incarnations preceding HIS. The absence of negative critical incidents also gave the 
organization a continuous ‘fair wind’ as it established credibility. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Emerging hybridity in HIQA: Critical issues at commencement challenging 
collaborative relationships and capacity building 
In contrast, HIQA is an external and independent regulator, established separately to previous 
improvement efforts. HIQA commenced operations in a negative and challenging context. A 
range of critical incidents (see Figure 4) led to early emphasis on top-down deterrence 
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activity premised on investigation and inspection. This provided a difficult platform from 
which to encourage organizations to engage in proactive disclosure and improvement efforts. 
As Ayres and Braithwaite (1992: 26) suggest ‘To adopt punishment as a strategy of first 
choice is unaffordable, unworkable, and counterproductive’. HIQA also has greater 
sanctioning powers than HIS, with capacity to close organizations. Its early structure may 
have alienated some in the clinical community. The majority of the founding board were 
laypersons and ‘there was a lot of angst about that’ (IP1). These factors, combined with 
HIQA’s lack of institutional legacy, may explain its initial struggle to build trusting, 
collaborative relationships with key stakeholders.  
 
Enabling and constraining hybridity  
In evaluating the conditions that shape or limit ready hybridization, we emphasize the role of 
founding and historical context. Despite both organizations sharing similar objectives in not 
dissimilar health systems, their contexts differentially affected their initial foci. HIS and 
HIQA had different starting platforms – persuasion and deterrence respectively. Notably, 
HIS’ persuasive starting premise differs from Reed’s (2011) presumed initial focus. Further, 
longstanding collaborative relationships between HIS and clinicians further enhanced the 
social context for hybrid regulation in Scotland (Steel and Cylus, 2012). In contrast, HIQA 
had a more deterrence oriented initial focus, previously noted by others. Specifically, NESC 
(2012) note that, in the context of residential care for older people, enforcement and 
inspection demands limited time available for support activities. Despite ‘interest in 
providing supports to centres to help them meet the standards’ in that context ‘efforts to 
avoid a conflict of interest, the priority accorded to registration and inspection, and a lack of 
resources, have meant that HIQA has not concentrated on this area of work’ (NESC, 2012: 
108).  
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However hybridity is dynamic, with potential for transition (c.f. Miller et al., 2008) 
requiring future research to revisit our findings. Notably, the addition of an explicit 
inspectorate function to HIS in 2009 may challenge existing synergy in Scotland. In contrast, 
HIQA documents published subsequent to data collection suggest that efforts to build 
capability and support improvement are gaining momentum. Its’ 2013-15 Corporate Plan 
prioritises providing education and building capacity in quality improvement methodologies, 
continuing to support improvement via national initiatives, and sharing good practice and 
learning (HIQA, 2013). In support, it established a training collaboration with IHI in 2013 
(HIQA, 2013a). These developments may reflect HIQA’s assertion (2013b) that ‘we have 
gained significant insights into not only the sectors that we monitor and regulate, but how we 
work and how best to engage with these sectors’. HIQA’s corporate documents, restructuring, 
and training partnerships are suggestive of an evolution in emphasis, enhanced investment in 
and promotion of improvement support and capacity building – and ongoing pursuit of 
regulatory hybridity.  
Whether and how to recreate regulatory hybridity: Lessons, future 
research and an integrative approach to health systems improvement 
In this section we consider lessons for those considering recreating or translating regulatory 
hybridity into other national contexts – and note aspects of hybrid regulation requiring future 
research attention. First, our findings draw attention to the importance of early regulatory 
focus and context, and potential for subsequent path dependence. This reflects David’s (1994) 
assertion that organizations are the carriers of history, with past experiences shaping the 
present via established expectations and behaviours.  
Second, HIQA’s experience, particularly in the light of exchange with senior HIS 
executives, raises questions regarding whether regulatory hybridity is replicable and scalable. 
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Hybridity in HIS was premised on long-term investment and the decisions and actions of key 
stakeholders in a unique, conducive and inimitable historical trajectory. Our analysis suggests 
that where replication and translation are attempted, it might be beneficial to embed bottom-
up persuasive processes to enhance improvement capacity and promote collaboration with 
key stakeholders, before top-down accountability mechanisms are introduced. Unless well- 
established and embedded, bottom-up approaches may be more likely to be ‘crowded out’ 
where contest or contradiction arises (c.f. Fischer and Ferlie, 2013). Further, contexts where 
regulators are forced to use their ‘big gun’ can undermine trust and collaboration (c.f. Ayres 
and Braithwaite, 1992). In contrast, adopting bottom-up, persuasive and professionally-
oriented approaches in the first instance may reflect Pache and Santos’s (2013) ‘Trojan horse’ 
approach to gaining legitimacy - helping to establish trust and collaborative approaches 
between stakeholders. This is important as Reay and Hinings (2009) suggest that competing 
logics may be reconciled and coexist where stakeholders develop mechanisms of 
collaboration.  
Third, this paper has considered the factors influencing whether and why regulatory 
hybridity (combining top-down deterrence and bottom-up persuasive approaches) emerged in 
two national contexts. However, our research is premised on a snapshot in time, and 
perceptions of interviewees rather than evidence of improvement. Future research should 
consider whether regulatory hybridity is sustainable, given increasing demand for tough 
inspection; the leadership requirements associated with combining the two approaches – 
within regulating and regulated organizations; and the impact of regulatory hybridity on 
quality improvement processes and outcomes.  
Next, in the light of challenges in achieving hybrid regulation, we question whether 
this is desirable, and present an integrative framework to guide the combination of top-down 
and bottom-up approaches to health systems governance for improvement. In so doing, we 
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are mindful that hybridized control systems are often ‘contested terrains’ (Reed, 2011: 60), 
offering professional elites delegated control overlaid by ‘panoptican’ type forms of 
surveillance (ibid). This creates challenges for national and local levels ‘to co-ordinate 
effectively their control strategies and practices in ways that sustain coherent narratives of 
change and innovation’, with ‘an underlying process of ‘hybridization’ in which control 
management becomes even more precarious and contingent’ (Reed, 2011: 57). Our 
framework is integrative, in following Reed’s (2011) concern with aligning national and local 
control strategies to sustain a clear improvement focus. Specifically, we suggest that the 
culture and capability of local organizations may affect the most appropriate national 
governance approach (e.g. a single hybrid regulator or otherwise) to supporting improvement.  
 
Towards an integrative governance framework for health systems improvement  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 5 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Organizations risk undermining consistency in performance when undertaking adaptation and 
improvement (Denis and Forest, 2012). Efforts to create hybrid health service regulation in 
Scotland and Ireland attempt to address this by encouraging employees in regulated 
organizations to adopt, adapt and add to best practice (c.f. McDermott et al., 2013), in line 
with Berwick’s (2013) call to generate responsive ‘learning organisations’. Our closing 
findings from Scotland – suggestive of mutual support between national and local agendas, 
and between standards, implementation capacity and innovation (potentially leading to 
refined standards) – are attractive. Coupled with hybridity’s emphasis on synergistic benefits, 
this might make a hybrid regulatory approach seem normative. Yet our findings suggest that 
hybridity may be hard to recreate, as ‘there is no such thing as an ahistorical optimal 
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regulatory strategy’ (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992: 101). In particular, while having both 
roles evident in regulatory systems may be desirable, complementarity may be difficult to 
achieve within a single organization (c.f. Fischer and Ferlie, 2013). Where there is potential 
for one approach to get ‘crowded out’, imbuing separate national organizations with 
responsibility for top-down and bottom-up approaches to improvement could enhance clarity 
and focus – and promote longevity. It could also help to avoid conflicts of interest within 
regulators, and regulatory capture (c.f. Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986, NESC, 2012). There 
is also a need to explicitly recognize the role that local health service delivery organizations 
(e.g. hospitals, social care organizations) play in supporting improvement (c.f. Berwick, 
2013; Denis and Forest, 2012).  This has previously been captured in the concept of ‘enforced 
self-regulation’, where individual organizations propose their own regulatory standards (c.f. 
Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992). Building on our findings, Figure 5 details distinct yet 
complementary national and local organizational roles. It provides a framework for 
identifying potential national improvement support roles to deliver together in pursuit of 
hybrid regulation (e.g. combining top-down and bottom-up national supporting roles) or to be 
pursued via independent organizations. It also identifies supporting local organizational roles. 
Discussion suggests that local stage of development may affect what is appropriate 
nationally.  
Quadrant 1 illustrates a top-down role for a national organization in ensuring the 
adoption of evidence-based best practice, drawing upon a range of potential deterrence 
oriented accountability mechanisms, such as standards, scrutiny and inspection. Evaluating 
performance using such mechanisms requires collation of performance information, ‘an 
essential prerequisite for continuous improvement’ (Gunningham and Sinclair, 1998) – 
although we note the IHI’s differentiation between information for judgement, and 
information for improvement (Haraden and Leitch, 2011). The investment required in 
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compiling and sharing best-practice evidence, as well as engaging in scrutiny to ensure its 
adoption makes it appropriate for a top-down national organization to lead this role.  
Quadrant 2 identifies a persuasion oriented capacity building role for a national 
organization, to enable employees to engage in bottom-up improvement activities, including 
adapting national agendas. Quadrant 2’s focus on education and training enables action on the 
basis of performance information. Although potentially counterintuitive for a bottom-up 
approach, the need to spread improvement capacity across the system means the centralized 
provision of change resources and training – as well as networks to spread learning – is 
appropriate. Importantly, like the provision of information, Gunningham and Sinclair (1998) 
suggest that education and training complement other regulatory instruments. However, our 
findings suggest that, in certain circumstances, their delivery might beneficially be separated 
from deterrence mechanisms - introducing the idea that interventions’ institutional home 
(separate or shared), as well as their content and sequence (c.f. Gunningham and Sinclair, 
1998), may affect their compatibility.  
  Quadrant 3 notes the important persuasive organizational role in empowering 
employees to utilize their bottom-up improvement capacity in their own organizations – 
adding to national efforts via trial and error and innovative problem-solving, and sharing 
findings from local evaluation efforts. Creating such a supportive climate for service-
improvement requires attention to sharing best practice information, and developing local 
leadership (McDermott and Keating, 2012).  
Last, Quadrant 4 notes the importance of organizations engaging in top-down efforts 
to embed cultures of improvement, innovation and learning – via board policies and 
priorities, clinical governance, local improvement support units, and celebrating success. This 
entails a combination of potential internal deterrence and persuasive mechanisms, employed 
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via development of local processes and supports. Quadrant 4’s focus may arise via 
voluntarism
1
, and also in response to the accountability mechanisms (performance and 
process standards) detailed in Quadrant 1. This is captured by Gunningham and Sinclair 
(1998: 433) who note that ‘voluntary based measures which seek to change the attitudes of 
managers and the corporate culture may serve to reinforce a commitment to process based 
standards’. Importantly, the culture change (encompassing behaviours and values) referred to 
in Quadrant 4 requires contextually sensitive interventions, such as those detailed above, to 
be effective (c.f. Ogbonna and Harris, 2002). While deep-rooted change to values may be 
difficult to achieve, behavioural compliance is more widely feasible (ibid), and may be 
captured via performance monitoring mechanisms.  
Building on our findings and following Gunningham and Sinclair (1998), Figure 5 
details a range of complementary regulatory instruments (accountability premised on process 
and performance standards; information; education and training and; voluntarism), tailored to 
specific goals, and notes the potential for these to be delivered via alternative configurations 
of national and local organizations. Importantly, our findings and this framework suggest that 
the regulatory functions in Quadrant 1 (Ensuring) and Quadrant 2 (Enabling) might be 
delivered via a single or separate national organizations – in response to contextual 
circumstances previously detailed. We have suggested that, if being combined in a single 
national regulator, it may be beneficial for the bottom-up ‘Enabling’ approach inherent in Q2 
to be embedded in the organization before the top-down focus on ‘Ensuring’ in Q1 is 
introduced. Following Berwick (2013) and Denis and Forest (2012), the model also 
recognises a role for local organizations (e.g. hospitals; social care organizations) in 
supporting improvement (e.g. Q3, Q4). Where local organizations have yet to embed cultures 
                                                          
1
 Gunningham and Sinclair (1998) note voluntarism and self-regulation overlap to a significant extent. However, the main distinction is 
that self-regulation typically involves industry level groups while voluntarism focuses on individual organizations self-regulating their 
members 
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of improvement, a focus on ‘Ensuring’ (Q1) via top-down formal regulation may help 
develop local organizational systems and processes (e.g. Q4). In contexts where Q1’s top-
down focus is likely to receive particular emphasis (e.g. in the foundational or early stages of 
regulatory systems, or in response to critical incidents), it may be constructive to deliver this 
separately to the bottom-up focus on Enabling inherent in Q2.  In health services where local 
cultures of improvement are well embedded (e.g. Q4) and where staff are commonly 
empowered to engage in improvement efforts (e.g. Q3) it may be easier to combine top-down 
and bottom-up approaches in a single national regulator - as Q1’s focus on Ensuring is less 
likely to be enacted in a punitive form. Thus, implicit in our framework is a suggestion of a 
variety of contextually responsive ways of achieving the policy goal of continuous proactive 
improvement. Previously detailed caveats in recommending hybrid regulatory control as the 
single ‘best way’, a focus on contextual responsiveness, and a concern with aligning national 
and local focus, lead us to adopt the language of integration rather than hybridity in 
describing the framework.  
Our findings have addressed calls for insight into the factors affecting hybridization, 
detailed the merits and challenges of regulatory hybridity, and provided an integrative 
governance framework to help select an appropriate regulatory strategy in a given context. 
While we note potential for hybridity to develop over time, we suggest that, in the absence of 
a receptive context, collaborative stakeholder relationships, adequate time or resources, or 
where an early deterrence orientation is required, it may be advisable to separate out national 
regulatory responsibility for top-down and bottom-up approaches to improvement. Our 
integrative model of health systems governance details specific national and organizational 
roles in achieving ongoing improvement – answering calls for policy design strategies to 
encourage organizations to go beyond regulatory compliance.  
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FIGURE 1: Overview of analytic strategy 
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FIGURE 2: Location of HIS in Scottish health system  
 
FIGURE 3: Location of HIQA in Irish health system  
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FIGURE 4: Historical timeline leading to HIS and HIQA 
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FIGURE 5: Integrative governance model 
 
 
 
